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To the extent that foreign trade has been dis-  expectations, the driving force behind the export
cussed in the debate about the transformation of  upswing were manufactures - not raw materi-
former centrally planned economies, discussion  als, mineral fuels, or agricultural products.
has focused on what should be done to minimize  Exports expanded because of the efforts of state-
the costs of external adjustment through man-  owned enterprises to export more in metallurgy,
aged foreign trade and exchange rate policies.  electro-engineering, and chemical and light
Little attention has been paid to the "supply-  industries.
side" forces behind export expansion.
Evidence on the relationship between
Kaminski addresses questions that have been  Poland's  export performance in the West (espe-
ignored: What product categories were the  cially trade with the European Comm=unity)  and
driving force behind he expansior. of exports to  the collapse of the CMEA seems to  suggest that
the OECD? To what extent were exports from  the fall in Polish exports to the CMEA was
the CMEA reoriented to the West? What was the  smaller than expected. The redirection of Polish
factor content of exports to the OECD? Was  exports from the CMEA fueled only limited
export expansion accompanied by a shift in  export expansio . to the West.
relative comparative advantage? Will the Central
European economies preserve their recent gains  The developments in Polish trade during the
in OECD markets?  first two years of the transformation program
suggest that attempts to recreate the CMEA
He finds that developments from the begin-  arrangements in some new guise would have
ning of the transformation program represent a  unnecessarily weakened incentives to restructure
dramatic acceleration of the trends in exports  the economy with its comparative advantage.
observed between 1984 and 1989. Contrary to
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The period following  the implementation  of the transformation-cum-stabilization  program in 1990  witnessed
a dramatic  opening of the Polish economy  to market forces accompanied  by a rapid growth in exports, especiadly
to the West.  The reorientation of Polish trade occurred in  the face of cbanges in extemal and domestic
circumstances  which were not particularly favorable  to an improvement  in export performance. Externally, the
CMEA  (Council  for Mutual  lconomic Assistance),  Poland's major trading  focus, was diaintegrating. Ihtr-CMEA
trade, accounting  for around  half of Polish  trade, had been falling  since 1986, and the survival of the organmian
was uncertain  in 1990. Its demise in 1991 came unexpectedly  quickly,' leading to a fail in CMEA import demand
for Polish  products and to a deterioration  in the terms-of-trade  vis-a-vis  the FSU (former Soviet Union). The end
of the Cold War changed Poland's political status in the West.  However, its access to Western markets did not
improve enough in the 1990-91 penod to explain the export upsmnng. Hence, the most sigificant  external
developments  relevant to Polish foreign trade durng  the first two years were the demise of the FSU and of the
CMEA.
Domestically,  the transformation  from an administrative  economic  system  involved  a simultaneous  chne
in mareconomic  policies and in their microeconomic foundadons.  The mroeconomic  stabilizaton  program wa
carried  out in an institutional  environment  dominated  by SOEs  (state-owned  enterprises),  resembling  administrative
units rather than  fall-fledged  firms  with unambiguously  defined  property  rights. Their organizational  structures  were
designed to facilitate  administrative  management  by the state.  In addition to the organizational  legacies, ther  was
a  legacy of production and investment heavily distorted by  the misallocation  of resources and the economic
stagnation  in the 1980s. As a result, the capacity  of SOEs to compete  internationally  wa  aso  limited  because  of
outdated technologies. Yet they expanded their exports to highly competitive  Westen  markets.
An intriguing  question is whether the export upswing to the West, defying  the previous trends, is a short-
term phenomenon. The paper addresses  this question  by comparing  the export performance  in the 1980s  with that
in the 1990-91  period,i.e., when some major systemic  constraints  of central  planning  were effectively  removed  and
I  The CMEA was officially dissolved  at its 46th General Session  held in Moscow on June 28, 1991.  Its
members  included  Bulgaria,  Cuba, Czechoslovakia,  the German  Democratic  Republic,  Hungary, Mongolia,  Polad,
Romania, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam.2
a supply-constrained  economy  was replaced  by a demand-constrained  economy.  It begins  with an attempt  to identify
the  supply-side' sources  accountable  for the sudden  improvement  in export  perfo0rance. It shows  that  the increa
in penetration  of OECD markets  was not a reversal  but the dramatic  acceleration  of treads observed  in the 1984-89
period; that it was driven by manufactured  goods, mainly  charactedzed by a high unilled  labor content; and that
it was triggered  by domestic  developments  rather than by extemal factors  such as the collapse  of the CMEA or more
cooperative  economic  relations  between  Poland  and OECD  countries. In its concluding  cection,  the paper disce
prospects  for sustaining  the new pattern of exports.
II. THE EXPORT BOOM  DURING  THE INITIAL STAGE OFTM  MARKET  TRANSMTION
Polish export performance  in Western  markets following  the implementation  of the stabilization  program
was a bright spot in an otherwise bleak picure of growing  unemployment,  expanding  budget deficits, perient
inflation, and falling aggregate output.  The expansion  defied projections of both Polish and Western exprU
involved  in the preparation  of the transformation  program. 2 They  had good reasons to be wrong.  When all policy
varables and incentive  structures  of economic  actors are in a state of flux, the chances for immediate  improvement
in economic  performance  are rather  slim.  In addition,  nothing  in the investment  patterns of the 1980s  would  point
to improvement  in Poland's competitiveness  in Western  markebt. Symptoms  of industrial  decline were abundant,
as many industrial  sectors did not have access to resources  to modemie  their aging productive  capacities.
IT.  1. Ugsetting  the Trend: Imroved  Com2etitiveness  in OECD markets
Polish export performance  dunng the fist two years of the transformation  progmm represented  a break
with some trends dominant  in the 1980s  and a continuation  of others.  Extrapolation  of 1980s  trends would have
sketched the foUowing  picture: Poland's position in Western markets would be stgnant  or improving  only at a
hesitant pace; its competitiveness  in the most rapidly expanding  markeb for manufactures  would continue  to slip:
and, its export  commodity  compositionwould  continue  to shift  towards  natural-resource  and unskilled  labor-intensive
2  Ihe  stabilization  progmm, as presented  in the Polish government  letter of intent submitted to the IMP,
aS8Umed  a slight increas  of exports and a hard currency  trade balance deficit  of $800 million  in 1990. Ihero was
acually a surplus of $2.2 billion. (Kolodko, 1991:13).3
products.  Yet t  pace at which exports to the OECD increased  and the extent of the shift to  mnufactures in  the
export structure  was astounding.
To set the developments  in exports to the West in the eauly  1990s  in perspective,  we briefly examine  trends
in the 1980s.  Polish trade with the West in the 1980s can be divided  into two distinct phases.  The first phase,
covaing the 1980-83  period, witnessed  its collapse  accompanied  by an aborted attempt  to cut links with the West.
While this phase  also witnessed  a contraction  in OECD total  import demand,  the decline  in Polish  exports was even
sharper and especially  deep for exports of manufactures:  the averago ratio of the fall in Poland's manufactures
exports to the fall in OECD imports of manufacnures  was 13.5 in the 1981-83  period.  During the second  1984-89
phase a policy of expanding  trade with the West was actively  pursued.  The results of this effort at the end of the
1980s  were nixed, however. On the one hand, among  Centrl and South  European  CMEA  countries, Polish  export
growth to OECD mrkets  was second to Xangary; but the ragion as a whole had performed  very poody.  (As can
be seen in Chart 1, betwee  1984 and 1990  its share in OECD imports  had been falling  each year.)  On the other
hand, taing  into account the virtul  collapse  of exports in 1981  anw 1982, the subsequent  export gowth left much
to be desired.  Poland's share in total OECD imports did not contract thaks  to improved export perfrnace  in
non-manufactures  marksets. Despite progressive lberalization of the foreign trade regune and strong poltical
preures  to boost exports to obtan much-needed  hard cuncy  revenues  to service its intemational  debt and pay
for imports, Poland failed to recapture the shar  of OECD markets  that it held in 1980.3 Ther  were increased
exporbt  of farm prducts,  mineral fuels and raw materials, but these  were not large enough to compensate  for the
dismal performance  in manufactures. In consequence,  Poland's export profile shifted towards low value-added
products.
To make these obsevations a  little mwre specific, Table 1 tabulates information on Poland's export
performnce by major  product categories. The table shows  the shares  in OECD imports  of Polish exports in 1980-
91.  In addition, it includes  average shares  in three periods: the 1981-83  collapse; the 1983-89  hesitant recovery,
3  In 1989 the share was still lower than it was in 1984 and 1985.4
and the 1990-91  export upswing.  The statistics  in Table 1, derived from trade data reported  by OECD partners, 4
are given for the following  broad commodity  categories:  foods and feeds (SlTC  Rev.2. 0+1+22+4);  raw materials
(SITC Rev.2. 2-22-27-28); mineral fuels (SlTC Rev.2.  3); ores and metals (SITC Rev.2. 27+28+68);  and
manufactures  (SITC. Rev. 2. 5+6+7+8-68).
Although  the collapse of exports in the early 198CG  ieft a lot of room for improvement,' only exporters
of coal, farm  products  and manufactures-the latter  two sectors  being the most affected by the contraction  (see Table
I)-succeeded in increasing  their shares  in OECD markets  in the 1984-89  period.  In view of the modernizatin of
the Polish industrial  base in the 1970s, financed  by Westerm  credits, the shift in Poland's comparative  advantage
(as revealed in exports to Western  markets) to natural resource intensive  products demonstrated  its inability  to
cormpete  in mEikets  for products  whose production  called for more sophisticated  technologies,  marketing  skills and
organion  techniques.
But the importat  point to note is that the developments  following  the introduction  of the transfomatian
program in 1990 were the reversl  of trends  observed  in the 1984-89  period.  While between 1989 and 1981
Poland's share in OECD important  had almost not changed  at all, it dramatically  increased  in the 1990-91  period,
nly  thanks to increased  exports of manufactures  (see Chart 1).  Export performance  improved in aU product
categories  including  manufactures  in the 1990-91  period.  Poland's exports increased  three-fold faster than OECD
total imports, while the ratio of t'hs increase in Poland's exports of manufactures  to OECD imports was 4.1 (see
Table 1).  The value of manufacures exports rose by 58% in 1990 and 23% in 1991.
4  The analysis does not cover all OECD members. It includes  ten members of the Eurpean  Community
(excluding Greece and Portugal), that is, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands,  Spun and United Kingdom, aU  members  of the European Pree Trade Association  (Austria, Finland,
Iceland, Norway,Sweden,  and Switzerland),  North America  (USA and Canada), and Japan.
5  The collapse  of Poland's exports to the West, triggered  by social  unrest and magnified  by the fall in OECD
import demand,  was immen.  Except  for exports  of mineral  fuels (mainly  coal), which fell less than  OECD import
demand  (at around  50  % of the OECD rate), aU  other  product  categories  lost their market sbares. The biggest  loser
were manufctures: their decline  was around  14 times  larger than the fall  in OECD import  demand for manufatured
goods.S
Table  1: Export  Performance of Poland in OECD Markets,  by product categories,  1980-91
Orm and
Total  Foods and  Raw  Mineral  Non-ferrous  Man;
Exports  Feeds  Materials  Fuel  Metals  facttua
1980  0.40  0.58  0.'S  0.37  0.88  0.32
1981  0.28  0.39  0.5,  0.19  0.75  0.24
1982  0.27  0.37  0.51  0.29  0.79  0.19
1983  0.27  0.44  0.49  0.33  0.65  0.16
1984  0.29  0.46  0.54  0.43  0.77  0.17
1985  0.28  0.55  0.54  0.40  0.78  0.16
1986  0.27  0.54  0.52  0.50  0.63  0.16
1987  0.27  0.58  0.49  0.44  0.61  0.17
1988  0.28  0.57  0.46  0.46  0.68  0.19
1989  0.28  0.65  0.39  0.43  0.60  0.19
1990  0.35  0.77  0.52  0.41  0.75  0.26
1991  0.38  0.65  0.57  0.45  0.98  0.31
Memorandum:  average in
1981483  0.40  0.58  0.66  0.37  0.88  0.32
1984-89  0.28  0.56  0.49  0.44  0.68  0.17
1990-91  0.37  0.72  0.55  0.43  0.87  0.28
Source: Derived from the United  Nations COMTRADE  data base.
11.2. Manufactures:  The Driving Force of the Exoort UPvswin
Contmary to expectations,  the driving  force behind  the Polish  export bloom in  the  1990-91 period  was
manufactures-not  farm  products,  energy,  and  raw  mateials,  as  one  might  have  expected.  Poland's  shar  in
OECD's  total imports rose  from 0.28%  in the 1984-89 period to 0.37%  (a 28%  increase) in the  1990-91 period,
mainly thans  to the expansion of exports of manufactured goods.  Poland's  share in OECD imports of manufactures
rose  from  0.17%  to 0.28%  (by 63%).  To put  this  development  in perspective,  in  1985 Poland's  exports  of
manufactures (USS 1.3 billion)  to the OECD were  about  17% and  8 % of Brazil's  (USS 7.2  billion) and  Korea's
exports  (USS  17.1 billion),  respectively,  in  1991 Poland's  manufactures exports  ($5.5  billion)  stood at 57%  of(share  In OECD  imports, percent)
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Brazil's  exports  (US$  10.4  bilion) and 14%  of Korea's  exports  (USS  40.8  billion). Manufactured  goods  accounted
fow  63  %  of the increase  i, the value  of Poland's  exports  in 1990  exports,  for 90  % ot  he i  acrease  in 1991,  and for
71  % of the  increase  between  1989  and 1991.
What  maufactures  were  a success  story  in Western  markets?  Table  2 gives  a list  of manw%faottzed  goods
which  cuntributed  most  to the export  upswing.  It contains  product  categories  meeting  the following  two  criteria
first, the  value  of exports  in 1991  was  larger  than  US  $10  millhn;  and, second,  the average  annual  rat  of growth
(in current  prices)  in the 1990-91  period  was  equal  to or larger  than  40% The  second  criterion  is quite  restrictive,
as it excludes  all product  categories  whose  value  failed  to almost  double  between  1989  and 199 . The products
were selected  from the breakdown  of exports  to the 1EC  at a three digit SITC (Standard  International  Trade
Classification)  leveld
Although  limited  to expotts  to the EC, the  analysis  of these  prociuct  groups  sheds  light  on developments
in Polish  exports  of manufactures  to the  West  in general. First, it should  be noted  that the  EC provides  an outlet
for almost  80% of Polish  products  sold  on OECD  markets,  and the SC share  has been  expanding.  Seond, the
value  of export  items  in Table  2 accounted  for around  23  % of total  Polish  exports  to the  EC in 199!  and for 42%
of its exports  of manufactured  goods. Third,  between  1989  and 1991  the value  of exports  of products  meetng the
above  criteria  inreased by more than  USS 1 billion,  and accounted  for more  than  onetird  of the increase  in
manufactures  exports  to OECD  countries. Thus, the exporters  meeting  the above  criteria  made  a significant
conlribution  to performance  in Westem  markets.
Several  observations  can be drawn  from eyeballing  the information  in Table  2.  Not surpningly, one
cannot  find high-technology  products:  Poland  like other  commumst  counties missed  the infiomution-computes
revolution.  Sectors which stand out in their export performance are representative  of the second industrial
6  As compiled  from the official  Polish  statistics  by Marczewski  (1992).  The shift from licensed-based
centralized  registration  to customs-based  recording  of trade  fl&w,  decreased  the reliability  of trade  statistics.  Yet,
this has little  impact  on this analysis  for two reasons. First, export  data are more  reliable  than  import  data; the
latter  are  particularly  poor  given  the  exponential  increase  in private  importers  and  the  notorous  absence  of recording
of these  imports  by customs  officials. The bulk  of exports  originated  in SOEs  which  continued  their  practice  of
reportig export  transactions  to state  agencies.  Second,  firms  have  an incentive  to underreport  exports  because  they
are taxed. Since  the  objective  of this analysis  is to identify  the  most  successful  export  performers,  neither  the first
nor the second  factor  influences  the results  sigcificantly.8
revolution,  driven by chesaical  and ste.i industries. 3xcluding  textiles  and most non-metallic  mineral  manufactures,
they were high on central planners' investment  priorities in the 1960s and to a lesser extent it  the early 197w.
Capital equipment is not on the list but the transport equipment industry-manly  thanks to shipbuilding-had  a
significant share.  Ironically, the shipbuilding  industry, which the communist  govemmont  wanted to cloLs for
allegedly economic reasons, succeeded in increasing its exports by almost 50% in both  1990 an4  1991, and
accounted  for around 10% of forign  currency  earnings of the 'successful' group.
Table  2: Pol'sh  Manufactured  Products  Exports  to  the  EC  in  1990  and  1991  and  their  Relative  Factor
Intensities  (FI).
Fl SITC  Description:  Division.  Rate  of  Growth  in  the  1990.91.  Value  of  Exports  (1991)
Group  ;group  heading)  (in  percent)  (US  S milion)
Ti  512  Organic  Chemicals  (alcohols  and  phenoLs)  53.4  72.4
TI  523  Inorganic  Chemicals  (organic  and  inorganic  42.8  65.9
compounds  of  precious  metals)
TI  562  Fertilizers,  manufactures  Cmineral  or  chemical)  165.1  125.0
TI  598  Chemical  Materials  and  Products  (miscellaneous)  40.3  10.5
NC  641  Paper  and  Articles  of Paper  Pulp (paper/paperboard)  4'0.5  49.6
NC  642  (paper/paper  board cut to aize or shape)  47.1  10.5
UL  651  Textile  Yarn  and Fabrics (textile  yarn)  4.4  15.3
MR  661  Non-Metallic  Hineral Manufactures  (lime,  cement,  etc.)  76.6  55.5
NR  663  (mineral manufactures)  134.0  18.6
UL  664  (glass)  45.8  25.4
UL  665  (glassware) 81.1  55.2
UL  666  (pottery)  67.2  20.4
NR  671  Iron and Steel  (pig  iron,  sponge  iron,  etc.)  92.5  18.3
NC  672  (ingots  and  other primary forms)  55.5  152.6
NC  673  (ien  and steel  bars. -ods, etc.)  89.9  264.0
NC  676  (rails  and  railway  truck  constrition  materials)  151.7  17.2
NC  678  (tubes, pipes, and fittings)  81.9  32.8
NC  679  (iron  and  steel  castings)  52.4  23.6
NC  691  Manufactures  of  Hetals  (structures)  67.6  83.9
NC  692  (metal  containers  for  storage  or  transport)  73.0  11.0
NC  697  (household  equip.  of  base  metal)  53.8  22.6
TI  728  Machinery  and Equipment  (machine-tools)  40.0  92.1
TI  741  Industrial  Machinery  (heating and  cooling  equip.)  44.9  16.6
Ti  743  (pumps  and compressors)  75.2  31.6
TI  744  (mechanical  handling equip. and  pprts)  47.1  27.4
HC  775  Household  electrical  and non-electrical  equipment
(laundry equip.)  51.9  57.4
NC  791  Transport  Equipment  (railway  vehicles)  70.2  13.8
UL  793  (ships, boats)  48.8  172.3
UL  841  Clothing  (outer  garments  of  textile  fabrics)  58.0  151.4
TOTAL  EXPORTS  (USS  million)  1,729.2
Note: Fl-relative  factor  intensities;  Ti  - technology-intensive  products;  NC  - human  capital-intensive
products;  NR  - natural  resource-intensive  products;  and  UL  - unskiLled  labor-intensive  products.
Source:  Derived  from  data  compiled  from  official  Polish  sources  by  Marczewski  (1992).9
II.3. Changes in Relative  Factor Intensities  of Exports to the West
Was  there a disceruible  shift  in Poland's revealed  comparative  advantage  in the 1990-91  period  as compared
with the 1980s?  Accrding  to the Heckscher-Ohlin  Theorem, commnodity  trade patterns reflect differences in
comparative  advantage  as determined  by different  factor endowments  among countries. A country  tends to export
those goods which use factors in relative abundance-an outcome  of a competitive  market mechanism  efficiently
allocating resources. Exploring a full causal chain linking factor endowments,  compamative  advantage  and trade
iuterns  is not relevant for this dir:ussion.  The question germane here concerns  broad changes in relative factor
intensities  as revealed in their exports to the West.
T,j test the Heckscher-Ohlin  Theorem, Krause (1988:91-95)  breaks commodity  groups  as classified  in the
SITC into four groups reflecting their distinct relative factor intensities.  These groups are: natural resource-
intensive  products; unskilled  labor-intensive  products;  technology-intensive  products; and, humanl  capital-intensive
products. 7 The first two groups represent lines of production  charcterized  by low value added, high natural
resource-mtensiveness  and sidple technologies. They account for a dominant  share of exports of countries  at the
lower end of the industrial  pecking order.'  While the line dividing  the technology-  and capital-intensive  groups
is fizzy, they both contain products requiring more sophisticated  inputs  than found in the first two groups.
The analysis of the weights of these groups in Polish exports proceeds in two steps.  First, we shall
examine  the factor  content of 'successful' manufactures  in EC markets  as compiled  in Table 2.  Second,  we survey
the changes in relative factor intensities  of total exports disaggregated  into four groups and assess the trends in
Poland's revealed  comparative  advantage  in Westem markets (see Table 3).
7  The first group consists of food, beverages, crnude  materials, mineral fuels, animal and vegetable oils,
teather, plywood, mineral manufactures,  diamonds and non-ferrous metals.  The second group, representn
commodities  with the lowest value added per worker, includes  textiles,  garments, furniture, glass, etc.  The third
group of technology-intensive  products are goods with the highest ratios of R&D (Research  and Development)
expenditures  to value added, whereas the human-capital-intensive  group contains  goods with the lowest ratios of
R&D expenditures  to value added.  The third group includes caemicals (plastics, ferdlizrs,  etc.),  somn capital
equipment,  telecommunications  equipment,  medical,  scientific,  and  measuring  equipment,  and  photographic  supplies.
The fourth group includes  such goods as paints, rubber, paper, TV and radio sets, etc.
'  For an extensive  discussion  of links between  level of development  and factor  content of exports, see Balassa
(1978) and Ytets (1989).10
Contrary to popular perception, the factor  content of manufactured  products  which regidstered  the highest
increase  in exports to the West  was not biased  in favor  of unskilled  labor or natual resource-intensive  products  and
their factor intensity  did not chang..  significantly  between 1989  and 1991.  The first column of Table 2 identifies
product groups by relative factor intensities. Products  responsible  for the largest share of exports listed in Table
2 are human capital-intensive  goods (12 product categories). They generated export revenues of $739 million,
accounting  for 47  % of exports of the 'successful  group. Tle second  largest contribution  came from technology-
intensive  products (9 product categories)-with  S458  million in exports.  They accounted  for 29% of the total in
Table 2. Hence, the two  groups  at the higher end of the value added  spectrum  accounted  for around  769%  of exports
with above-average  performance.  Their share in the increase in total exports of products identified in Table 2
between  1989  and 1991  was roughly  the same  which  suggests  that  within the 'above-average-expansion'  grup  dim
was no major shift in relative factor intensities.'
Products  typical  of a low level of industrial  &evelopment  accounted  for the remaining  24  % of exports. The
unsklled labor-intensive  group (5 product  categories)  accounted  for 18%, and the value of their exports was $289
million. The value of exports of products  belonging  to the nabual resource-intensive  goup  (3 product  categories)
was $92  million. Thus, among  the industial sectors  setting  the pace for export expansion  in 1990  and 1991,  human
lcapital- and technology-intensive  products  played a dominant  role, and-as we shall see below-the latter was the
component  changing  more rapidly in the export commodity  composition  in 1991.
Given Poland's relatively ample endowment  in some non-renewable  natural resources and its moderate
climate favoring  agriculture,  the share of natural  resource-intensive  products  in total  L xports-as opposed  to a limited
sample of manufactures  exports-was significantly  larger. The Polish  export struture  lecame less human capital-
and technology-intensive  in the 1980s.  Although the share of the technology-intensive  group in Polish exports
increased, its EC-10 (European  Community  excluding Greece and Portugal) maret  share remained constant  and
9  The total increase oG  exports between 1989 and 1991 was US$1,020.4  million.  The value of exports of
human capital-intensive  products in 1991  was $477.2 million  higher than in 1989, of technology-intensive  $287.7
million higher, of unskilled labor-intensive  $167.6 million higher, and of natual  resource-intensive  $87.9 million
higher.  Their shares  were 46.8%, 28.2%, 16.4%, and 8.6% respectively.the RCI (revealed comparative index'")  feli slightly (see Table 3).  The share of products characterized  by high
human capital input fell in both Polish  exports and EC-10  imports. Polish exporter. outperformed  other suppliers
only in low value added production,  demonstrating  a significant  improvement  in 'revealed  comparative  advantage
in natuil  resource- and unskdlled  labor-intensive  products.
As can be seen from Table 3, neither in the 1980s nor in the 1990-91  period did the factor content of
exports move towards products requiring highly skldled  labor and technological sophistication.  The share of
unskilled  labor-intensive  products  in Polish  exports  significantly  increased  in  both the 1980s  and the 1990-91  period:
their share rose from an average of 16% in the 1984-89  period to 21  % in the 1990-91  period.  Part of this increame
could be attributed  to changes in relative  prices in favor of manufactures  with the fall in the prices of raw materials
and energy din the 1980s.  However, a more adequate  explanaton of the increased weight of unskilled-labor
intesive products  is that the capital stock was rapidly  deteriorating  and there was a shift towards  aral  resource-
and unslilled labor-intensive  products.  At the same time there was a decline in the competitiveness  of the Polish
economy  in products  at the higher  end of the value-added  spectrum. The 'high-technology  content"  of manufactures
in tho 1980s  was lower than in the 1970s (Po7nanski,  1988:46-52)." Therefore, the export push could only come
from traditional sectors characterized by high capital and unskdlled  labor content.  It could not come from
sophisticated  enineering products, because  their production  was not well developed.
Viewed  thdough  the lenses  of relative  factor  intensity  and  aggregaW  comparative  advtage  indexes  of Table
3, some developments  in the 1990-91  period were a continuation  of trends observed in the 1980s while others
marked at least a temporary reversal of trends.  On the one hand, the Polish export structure continued  to move
towards  nskilled  labor-intensive  products: their share and competitive  position  rose as revealed  in the increase  of
their EC-10 market  share and their share in Polish  exports. Their share in both Polish export and EC-10  imports
'°  A country's  "revealeds  comparative  advantage  in a product *j  is defined  as the ratio of the share of *j"
in the country's exports to the sire  of the product "j" in world  trade (see Balassa, 1965). A value for this index
below unity indicates a comparative disadvantage. If the index takes a value greater than unity, the country is
considered  to have a zrevealed' comparative  advantage  in the product.
"  The CMEA exported mainly raw materiads  and low-processed  goods to the non-socialst world. They
accounted  for about 70 percent of its exports in the 1980s. The share of high 'echnology  products  in export to the
West, for example, feli from 1.2 percent in 1980 to 0.6 percent in 1986; at the same this share in exports of the
Third World increasod  from 9.8 percent to 13.2 percent (Zvie  Goso-dar  Warsaw, No. 35, 1988)12
recorded the largest increase in 1991, rising from 19% in 1990 to 23% in 1991, and the EC-10 market share
increased  from 0.77% to 1.03%.  Similarly, despite the shift in Poland's commodity  composition  towards  human
capital-intensive  products  and the increase in the share of EC-10 markets  for this product group, the shift was too
small to produce a significant  change in Poland's competitive  position  in these markets.  On the other hand, in
defiance  of the trends  in the 1980s,  technology-intensive  products  doubled  their share in EC-10 markets  from 0.15%
in 1989 to 0.27% in 1990, and to 0.29% in 1991.
Table  3:  The  Comaosition  of  Polish  Exports  to  the  EC-10  According  to  Factor  Intensities  and  Revealed  Caoparative
Advantage  Indexes,  Averages  for  the  1980-83,  1984-89,  and  1990-91  Periods.
Composition  of  Polish  Revealed  Comparative  Advantage
Exports  to  tho  EC-10  Indexes
Relativ  Fwctor-Intensity  Groups  1980-83  1984-89  1990-91  1980-83  1984-0  1990-91
(in  percent)
Natural  Resource-Intensive  67.3  62.7  50.8  1.38  1.68  1.65
Unskilled  Labor-intensive  12.7  16.4  20.7  1.28  1.44  1.62
Technology-Intensive  7.7  8.8  15.3  0.35  0.31  0.50
Human  Capital-Intensive  12.2  12.0  13.2  0.65  0.53  0.51
Memorandum:  Shares of  Imports  from  Poland in  Total  EC-10  Imports
1980-83  1984-89  1990-91
(in  percent)
Natural  Resource-Intensive  0.6  0.7  0.9
Unskilled  Labor-Intensive  0.5  0.6  0.9
Technology-Intensive  0.1  0.1  0.3
Human  Capital-Intensive  0.3  0.2  0.3
Source: As  in  Table 1.
Too short a period of time  has elapsed  to make  any firm statments as to whether this development  presages
a movement  up the technological  ladder in Polish  exports to the West.  he comparison  of 1991 with 1990 points
to a fail in the competitiveness  of exporters  of technology-intensive  products. Since the technology-intensive  group
in Polish exports consisted  mainly  of traditional  labor- and energy-intensive  products,  it is likely  that some of them
lost their sompetitive  edge once prices of energy  were no longer subsidized  in 1991.
Given the relatively high quality and degree of scientific  education  in Poland, there is an inconsisecy
between  Poland's endowment  in human capital and the move toward  unsophisticated  labor-intensive  products  in its
exports. Hamilton  and Winters  (1992) show  a positive  correlation  between  educaton in Poland  (and  in other  Central
European  countries) and comparative  advantage  in sophisticated  engineering  goods which, however, is yet to be
revealed in its exports to the West. Whether this dissonance  is only a transitional  phenomenon,  the legacy of the13
earlier misallocation of resources, wiU depend on whether private investors are able to exploit this potential
comparative  advantage  and whether government  creates  a friendly  environment  for export-oriented  activities.
HI.  THE COLLAPSE  OF EXTERNAL IUNKS  DISTORTING  TRADE  PATERNS:  THE FSU AND THE
CMEA
The export expansion to the West coincided  with the demise of the Soviet-dominated  CMEA and the
emergence  of Poland's new intemationa!  political  status  as an ally of the West. While the latter improved  Poland's
access to Westem markets, though  only to a small degree during the period under discussion,  the former had an
immediate impact on Polish commercial  relations  in 1990  and 1991.  The Soviet market which provided an easy
outlet for sectors  developed specifically  to meet its requirements-as a rule much less exacting  than elsewhere-has
almost disappeared. 2 Because  of the contraction  in Soviet import demand and the gradual shift to convertible
currencies in their trade transactions  in the lat3 1980s  and in the 1990-91  period, Polish  exporers had already been
losing preferential  access to Soviet markets. By 1991, when the full switch to hard currency  occunred,  they had
to compete in former CMEA markets  on the same footing  as other suppliers. This put an end to the dual external
environment  for Polish trade activity;  one subject  to market  forces  and another  nurtured by preferential  intr-CMEA
arangements.  The former comprised  the so-called  'hard goods,'  while as to the latter it was suspected  that most
manufactured  goods were 'soft  products  unmarketable  in the West because  of high costs and low quality. This
section addresses two questions:  what was the extet  of reorientation  of Polish exports from the CMEA to the
West?; and, what was the extent  of export diversion  away from the CMEA?
Although  the demise of the CMEA  has inflicted  a heavy cost on the Polish economy,' 3 its impact was less
damaging  than for other CMEA  countries because  of a lower dependence  on the CMEA. Poland's dependence  on
Soviet and other CMEA markets had decreased  well before the demise of the FSU.  A reorientation  of Poland's
12  The Soviet Union  accounted  for around  60% of Polish  trado with the CMEA in 1989  (Schrenk, 1992:221).
'3  The shrinking  supply and demand  of the FSU and the shift to world  prices resulted  in a drmatic worsening
of the terms-of-trade,  estimated  at between  20  % and 40% (Oblath  and Tarr, 1992), and in undercutting  economic
viability  of sectors  nurtured by CMEA  preferential  agreements. According  to an estimate  quoted  by Blejer  and Gelb
(1992:3), the terms-of-trade  loss reduced the GDP of Poland by 4%.14
trade was already underway in the 1980s.  Between  1970 and 1990, the CMEA share foU  from 60% to 39%.14
Yet the reorientation  of Polish trade  away from the CMEA  during the first two years of the transformation
program was formidable;  however, it was mainly  due to the expansion  of trade with the OECD rather than to the
collapse  of import demand  in the CMEA. The share of the former CMEA in Poland's exports (in current prices)
fell from49% in 1985  to 16.9% in 1991,  with the FSU accounting  for 11% ofPolishexports, and Czecho-Slovakda-
-the second largest trading partner in the CMEA-for 4.7%.  The share of the EC rose from 23% of the total in
1985  to 47.2% in 1990 and to 55.6% in 1991.  However, the fall in exports to the CMEA in 1991 was much
smaller than the increase in the value of exports to the West.'s  Table 4 presents annual incremental  changes in
the value of Poland's exports in 1990  and 1991  as well as during the period from 1988 to 1991  (the period during
which the value of intra-CMEA  exports was falling) to the FSU, other Europeani  CMEA members, and OECD
countries (EC, EFTA, North Amenca and Japan). Three points  are worth noting. First, the pattem of change in
trade with 'small  CMEA members  was different  than  with the Soviet Union, especially  in 1991.1 Following  the
dissolution  of the TR payments mechanism  in January 1991, exports to the Soviet Union increased  and to the
CMEA-4  (Bulgaria,  Czacho-Slovakia,  Hungary, and Romania)  coUapsed. Second,  the increase  in exports  to OECD
makts  more than offset the fail in exports to the CMEA-4  makes.  Third, the increase in Polish  exports to the
FSU in both 1990  and 1991  followed  the earlier expansion  in 1988  and 1989. Th  increas  between  1987  and 1991
was slightly above US S1 bilion.  Since Soviet  exports had been falling  since 1988, Poland ran significant  trade
surpluses,  apparently needed to pay off its debt to the Soviet Union.
It is tempting  to draw the conclusion  that  thanks  to Western  trade, Polish  enterpri,  mainly  state-owned,
14  The declining international  compeditiveness  forced Poland to offer industrial produec at more heavily
discounted  prices, which in turn implied  a substantia devaluation  of the tansferabl  ruble (TR) relative to the US
doUlar. Th  revalued trade figures suggest a long-term trend of declining shares of the CMEA in Polish total
exports. For revalued estites  of trade of the CMEA  and the FSU, see Table 4.3 in Pohl and Sorsa (1992).
1  Having recalculated  CMEA trade data using the uniform (Hungaran) mble/US5 exchange  rate, Neal
(1992)  concludes  that  not only  Poland  but also Czechoslovalda  and Hungary  -.. filly offset  lost CMEA  trade tdrough
expanded  exports to western industrial  countries.'
Id  Polish exports to the CMEA-4 did not fail in  1990, the last year of the existence of soft payments
arangements.1S
could more than compensate  for losses in CMEA.4 markets  in 1990  and 1991. This conclusion  is not necessrily
conect, since  not all of the exports to the CMEA-4  could have been redirected  to the West and the import demand
of the FSU shifted to  harder  goods.  While more research is needed at the firm level, some preliminary
observations  can be derived  from comparing  changes  in Poland's  exports before and  after an almost  complete  switch
to hard currency settlements  in intra-CMEA  trade occunred  in 1991.
Table  4:  Changing  Polish Export orientation  from the CHEA  to the OECD,  1988  to  1991.
1990  1991  Total
(US  SmiLlion)  1988-91
(Former)  Soviet union  78  335  1081
Other European  m'Thers  of the CHEA-4  498  -834  -67
OECD  countries  2557  1110  4845
TOTAL  3133  611  5859
Nemorandu: FSU:  Balance  of  Trade  -1282  -1410
Source:  IMF,  Directfon  of  Trade  Statistics  Yearbook,  1992
Te  chuage in the composition  of exports by area can be used as a proxy measure  depicting  the extent  of
the switch  in Poland following  the dramatic  opening of the economy  in January 1990.  The composition  of Polish
exports to the CMEA and to the EC was tmditionally  strongly  dissimilar:  the former having  a large component  of
capital equipment  and eectro-engineerng, wheroas  in the latter food, raw material  and energy dominated. The
former were regarded as soft goods which because of low quality could not be sold in markets other than th
CMEA, the latter were hard goods, imposing  hard currency  opportunity  costs for tho CMEA  exporters.  Table S
contrasts the composition  of Polish exports to the CMEA and the EC broken down to farm products, energy,
prinary and inrmediat  manufactured  products,  and capital equipmenL It gives indexes  of simiaity  between  the
two stuures  in 1985, 1989, 1990 and 1991."7  The index assumes  the value of zero if the two stuctues  an
entirely  different, and the value of one when they are the same. There  has been a convergence  in the composition
n
"The  index of similarity  equals  1 - (e:-e7  ) 2 ,  where: e' denotes the share of a produCt
category "i* in exports to the CMEA; e°-the  share of a productcategory *i  in exports to the OECD.16
of export baskets,  as measured  by this index; similarity  increased  steadily  between  1985  and 1990, and then  jumped
highly in 1991. The general  conclusion  which  can be drawn  from examining  the data in Table 6 is that the product
structure of industrial exports to the former CMEA countries has moved rather dramatically toward the EC
structure.
Table  5: Corposition  of  Polish  Exports  to  the  CHEA  and the  EC  in  1985, 1989,  1990 and 1991
1985  1989  1990  1991
Industries  EC  CMEA  EC  CNEA  EC  CMEA  EC  CNEA
(in  percent)
Electro-engineering  11.3  63.8  20.7  71.0  21.6  67.7  22.0  45.3
Metallurgy  15.1  7.3  21.0  4.0  23.1  6.1  24.3  6.5
Chemical  11.8  9.5  11.2  11.6  13.3  11.1  10.2  21.6
Wood  and Papea  4.2  0.7  6.5  0.7  6.3  0.5  11.1  0.7
Light  7.1  5.5  8.0  3.3  8.0  6.1  8.7  5.0
Processed food  11.8  2.0  19.9  1.7  15.1  2.5  14.3  7.2
Fuels and Energy  38.7  11.3  12.7  7.S  12.6  6.1  9.4  13.7
Memo:  Index of  Simitarity
0.6321  0.6766  0.7345  X.C=2
Source:  Calculated  from data  in  The State  of  the  Economv:  Includira  Forecasts  for  the  Future:  First  Half  of
1992: A Brief  Sumary,  Central  Planning Office,  Warsaw  1992, Table 20.
Taking into account that the transfenmble  ruble almost totally disappeared  from commercial  tractions
in 1991 and that the former-CMEA  exporters lost preferentisl access to each other's markets, the increased
simiarity of the two export structures  can be explained  as follows. Faced with market  constraints, impots  in the
former CMEA countries  slashed soft goods in favor of hard goods, independety  of thir  origin.  They were not
willing to spend  scarce foreign  exchange  on goods produced  by their former ttading  partners from the Soviet  bloc,
unless they were competitive  with products  offered on international  markets.  In 1991 the change in the strut
of import demand was exacerbated  by a steep decline in aggregate output and investment activity in all post-
communist  countries. Therefore, some portion  of the decline  cannot  be attributable  to the lower quality  of products
from the CMEA, but to the fall in import demand  for capital goods and other inrmdiate  products.  Given tho
increase in the share of the electro-engineering  sector in exports to the EC in tho 198S-91  peiod,  some portion of
the decline of this sector in exports to the CMEA  can be attributed  to the reorientation  away from the CMEA.
Rodrick (1992:18), having  analyzed  the changes in shares  for both Hungarian  and Polish exports betwoe17
1985 and 1990, draws a conclusion  that '...  there is no evidence  thst the overall increase  in trade with the West
was feled  by redirecting  Eastern sales to the West, or indeed that the latter played any role at all in the former."
However, the available  evidence for 1991  suggests that some portion of the export increase to the West was the
reswt of diverting  products  no longer demanded  by former CMEA  trading partners. Indicative  of the diversion  is
that  the industrial  product structure  of Polish  exports to the EC shifted more toward  that of the CMEA, rather than
the other  way around.  As was pointed  out earlier, among manufactures  which contnbuted  most to the export push
were products  of the electro-engineering  sector.
Between  1985 and 1990  the combined  value of exports of power generating  equipment  (the main product
of the electro-engineering  sector representative  of the soft goods) to the FSU and the EC slightly increased  from
$864 minlion  to $884 million, with the EC accounting  for a growing share of these exports. The increase of EC
imports  of power  generting equipment  (SITC. 71) from Poland  was very substantial. They rose at an avenge rate
of around  20% in the 1986-89  period, and increased  by 60  % in 1990  alone.'@  Exports to the FSU sta8nated  during
this period.  The average  value of exports to the FSU in the 1985-89  period was $662 million,  while that to the EC
was $157 million.  The difference  between  the value of exports in 1990 and the average for the 1985-89  period
offers some insights as the extent of the diversion: in 1990 the value of exports to the FSU feU  short by  $139
million, while that to the EC was $207 million  higher than the average in the 1985-89  period.  Hence, the loss of
the Soviet market for power generating  equipment  was more than offset by increased  exports to the EC."
This observation  is confirmed by the following:  combinadon  of expanding  exports and falling domesic
demand resulted in a sgnificant inrease  in the share of exports in total output of industrial sectors with the
exception  of electro-engineering,  a traditional  supplier  to the FSU.  Its export share fell from 29% in 1989  to 26%
in 1991. Moreover, during this time the share of this sector in total industrial  exports declined  from 38% to 22%
because  of failing exports to the CMEA: its share in exports to this region fell precipitously  from 62% in 1989 to
I  All data taken from the United Nations  COMTRADE  data base, as reported by Poland. As of November
1992, Poland  had not supplied data on its foreign  trade in 1991.
1"  One important  caveat should be made: given the high level of aggregation,  this analysis  cannot suggest  that
the same products  were simply shifted from the CMEA to the West or that they were manufactured  by the sam
producers.18
38% in 1991. At the same time, however, its contribution  to exports to tho EC remained  at around 18% in 1989
and 1991, thus keeping  the same rate  of growth in value terms  as total industial export to the EC.  fhis expauion
would not h&ve  been possible without  some diversion  of sales from tbe CMEA to the EC.
A striking foreign tade-related feature of the transformation  program was the increase in openess  of
s6ctors previously oriented toward domestic makets.  The export orientation  of sectors which bad neither been
nurtured by intra-CMEA  specialization  schemes nor exposed to Western  markets increased  significantly  between
1989  and 1991. For instance,  the export share of total  sales of such sectors as wood-paper  rose from 11% in 1989
to 32% in 1991, and of light industry from 9% to 22% (CPO, 1992:46).?  The shares of these industries in
exports to the EC increased  significantly  during this period (see Table 5).
An interesting point coming out of this analysis is that the Polish authorities were corect  to ignore the
advice of Western experts to establish  the East Europon Payment  Union to promote trade among the CMBAa
The advice failed to take into account salient  characteristics  of intra-CMEA  trade and the impact of the shift from
a demand-consrained  to a supply-constrained  economy. First, the proponents  of this scheme  acted on  e premso
that the CMEA had been swcessful in integrating its member-countries'  economies.  The much lower than
anticipated  imqpact  that the dissolution  of the CMEA  had on the Polish  economy  in 1991 supports the idea that the
economic  dependence  level was not as considerable  as some earlier analyses had suggested. The FSU's varous
attmpts to iupose supta-nationad  planning  and to increase intra-idustry integration  within the CMEA failed.
Second, the dramatic  change in the commodity  composition  of Polish exports to the CMEA  in 1991 was
mainly the rult  of the collapse of exports of soft goods.  Extending  the CMEA arrangements  under the guise of
an East European  Payments  Union  would  have negatively  affected  welfare  of all its participants. This trade would
have  had to be subsidized  simply becauws  domestic  production  costs exceeded  world prices. Thus, the introduction
20  Between  1989 and 1991 the volume  of total sales of the wood-paper  and light industries  declined by
around  30% and 40% respectively. Had their export shaes remained  at 1988  levels, sales of the wood-paper  sector
would  have fallen  by an additional  14.3 percentago  points  and light industry  sales by 15.0 percentag points. Thus,
it appears the fall in domestic demand  accounted  for 51 percent of the increased export orientation  of the wood-
paper sector and 32 percet  of light industry's reorientadon.
21  The most vocal wero analysts from the United Nations Economic Commion  for Europe (lCE-1990),
Brabant  (1991), and Havrylyshyn  and Williamson  (1990).19
of an East European  Payments  Union  would  have unnecessarily  weakened  incentives  to restructure  trade in line  with
actual compamtive  advantage.
IV.  IS THE EXPORT  EXPANSION  TO THE WEST SUSTAINABLE?
There are stil  too many blank spots to be able give an unequivocal _  ent  as to whetwr  the
improvemnt in export performance  characteristic  of the first two yeats of the trasformation program in Poland
is a short-term  phenomenon. Externally,  its sustainability  hinges upon the reduction  of trade barriers in the West
as well as growth of Western import demand. Domestically,  sustainability  will be affected by the pace at which
an environment  enhancing  growth, macroeconomic  stability  and microeconomic  efficiency  is reached.
Barring  unexpected  domestic  and extemnal  shocks, access to Western  markets in the immediate fuue  will
considerably  improve  in comparison  to the 1990-91  period. The change  in the intemational  political  status  of Poland
as a result of the ending of coummnism  did not have a sgnificant impact on its export performance  in 1990  and
1991.  Poland had GSP satus  in the EC since 1989.  Moreover, most EC import quotas were not binding.
Iplementation  of some measures helped, however, including the extension of OSP (Generalized System of
Preferes)  tratmet  by Westem governments,  the restoration  of MFN (Most  Favored Nation)  status in the United
States, the increase  ot textile  and clothing  quotas  by the EC, and the elimintion and supension of sotm quantitaive
restrictions by the EC to reward the Polish govenment  for the introduction  of the Economic  Transformation
Program on January 1, 1990.22  These measures  did not include agriculture  and steel-products in which Poland
had comparative  advantage.
Yet all these  masures  fade into insignificance  when  seen against  the fiture improvement  in access to Wed
European  marets  thanks  to the European  Association  Agreement  signed between  Poland and the EC in December
1991  and to the Gothenburg  Declarations  promising  the establishment  of a free tbade  aea  between  Polad  and the
EFTA, signed  in June 1990. The free trade agreement  with the EFTA  was signed  in November  1992. It is broadly
sir-ilr  to the trade section of the 'Europe Agreement.-
=  On 1 January 1990, the EC eliminated  all quantitative  restrictions  that were not in conformity  with Article
XII of the GAIT,  as applied  to a Trading State  (i.e., a centrally  planned  economy). Around 12% of Polish  exports
in 1989 were affected by these restrictions  (Moebius  and Schumacher, 1990, quoted in OECD 1992).20
Full membership  in the EC, as envisaged  in the 'Europe Agreement, should be on the top 9f the agenda
of the Polish govenment.  Intgration with the EC will provide  guidance  t  institutional  transformation  and shield
Poland to some  extent from adverse  developments  in its other international  trade. While  borrowing  institutions  from
a different  environment  is not always  productive,  the necessity of matching  solutions  concernisg the organization
of the banking  sector, development  of fiscal  policy  instruments,  setting  of industrial  standards,  etc. sets  a clear path
to be followed.
The provisions  of the European  Association  Agreement  are to be phased  in over the next 10 years.  As the
free trade provisions  of the "Europe  Agreemento  became  effective  on March 1, 1992,  PolanL  has obtained  duty-free
access to EC markets for a wide range of manufactures. Thanks to the Agreement,  exports of more than 50% of
Polish manufactured  goods to the EC are no longer subject to trade barriers (Marczewskd  1992:8). The provisions
of the European Agreement  directly relevant to trade include also the removal of aU trade barriers by 2002, and
the lifting of customs  barriers within two to five years.
Hence, in the long term, the -Europe Agreement will significantly  expand  the access of Polish exporte
to the EC, its largest trading  partner.  Another  potential  bene.fit  of the Agreement  with foreign trade impact is that
the attractiveness  of Poland  to foreign  investors  is likely  to increase. Thus, Polish  industries  should also profit from
the finai cial resources and know-how  of Western firms.  As a result, the export bascet is likely to expand and
become more diversified.
In the short term, the expansion  of Polish  exports critically depends  on the growth of import demand in
the EC-10, especially  in Germany, which replaced the FSU as Poland's largest trading partner in 1990.  In 1991
the main engine of Polish export growth was Germany.'  Had it not been for expanding  German markets for
Polish products, it is rather unlikely that the 1990 export upswing  would  have extended  into 1991. Its exports in
current prices to the EFTA, North America and Japan slightly contracted, to other EC-9 countries stgnated
(increased by a  mere $7 million in current prices), but they grew by  more than US $1 billion to Germany.
Therefore, a slow down in economic  grwth  in Germany  is likely  to have serious consequences  for Polish  exports.
3  Germany'sshareinPolishtotalexportsincreasedfroml4%in1989to25%inl990andto29%inl991
(MWGZ-1992:8). Excluding  Germany,  EC demand  for Polish  products  stagnated  in 1991; thus, Germany's shar
in Polish exports to the EC-10 increased  from around  50% in 1990 to 58% in 1991.21
From the view-point  of domestic  developments,  the export expansion  was initidly propelled  by the swift
movement to a new set of institutional  arrangements,  revamping  the existing incentives  structures.  The virtual
termination of  the  supply-constrmined  economy in  1991, the  result  of  decontrolling prices and  restoring
mcroeconomic fiscal and monetary  controls, combined  with the introduction  of current account convertibility  of
the Polish zloty, produced a strong export stimulus not only to the West but also to the CMEA  just  before its
coflapse.2Y  Faced with the collapse  of domestic  consumer  demand,  devaluation,  and the elimination  of govemnment
subsidies,  export expansion  becume  one of the few  survival options  available  to SOEs. During the first year of tho
transformation  program, the rapid appreciation  of the zloty (which followed the devaluation regarded by many
analysts as excessive5) bad little impact on the propensity  of Polish SOEs to export.  Despite the appreciation,
exports continute to increase through 1990, suggesting  that exporters were relatively  immune to the changes in
exchange  rate policy. With the hardening  of the budget constmaint  and the depletion  of reserves  acumulated under
the administrative  economic system,'  their capacity to compete successfuflly  in international  markets may be
jeopardized.
Although  the increase in exports to OECD markets was quite dmmatic, this does not necessrily  imply a
dramatic change in competitiveness  and export potential  of the Polish economy. Fornasari and Grilli (1992:12)
rightly warn that U...  the positive results achieved in restoring external balance [..J should not be interpreted as
successful instances  of production  and trade reorientation  folowing the external shocks of 1990-91..."  Poland's
industrial  base, inherited  from central  planning,  has remained  unchanged  and will not be transformed  unless  a strong
upward trend in output and capital formation takes place.  One may also suspect that in many instances  export
proceeds do not cover full production  costs, representing "distress sales."  In addition, they may be de fact
subsidized  by intra-enterprise  credits and 'bad'  loans from the state-owned  banks.  Thus, their competitive  edge
7A  In contmst  to otherwise stagnating  intra-CMEA  trade, Poland  ran trade surpluses  with most of its CMEA-
trading  partners in 1991 (See Kaminkid,  1991).
'1  The new rate, introduced  on January 1, 1990,  represented  an almost 50  % devaluation  of the Polish  currency
vis-a-vis  the US dollar.  It was criticized  as excessive  (see, for instance, Olechowkid,  1991; Polazaski,  1992)
21  For their discussion,  see Winiecki, 1990.22
may  be short-lived.
Although  the Polish  economy  continued  its export-orientation  in ealy 1992,7 poweRul  supply  bariers
reducing  competitveness  of exporters  or manufactures  may  soon  surfae for  at least  two  interelted reasons.  First,
the impressive  export  expansion  of technology/capital-intensive  goods,  a significant  portion  of them  diverted  from
the  FSU  and other  CMEA  markets,  is likely  to be constained  by the  existing  production  capacity  of plbnts  which
cannot  be increased  quickly. Second,  taking  into  account  that the  increas in domestic  costs  more  rapid  than  the
increase  in export eamings  because  of the zloty appreciation  in 1990  and 1991, exporters  lack resources  to
modnize  their  production  equipment. This probably  was also the cs  in 1991,  when investm  fell while
consumption  rose despite  falling  output.
This  pessimistic  outcome  is not inevitable  and may be controlled  to some  extent by appropriate  govenmet
policies.  The export upswing took place in an institutional  environment  whose fil  pro-xport  potential  is yet to
be tapped. There are at least two instittional consti ints which  may be overcome. The first relates  to the
dominance  of the  state-owned  sector  and its transformation.  The  second  is the absence  of organiztions  providing
information  and credits  for export-oriented  activities.
During  the initial stage  of the transformation,  the export  pu  cam  from SOEs with orgaztional
structures  inherited  from  centrl planning.  When  faced  with  the domestic  demand  constraint,  the SOEs  displayed
an unexpected  capacity  to compete  in intenatonal maets.  However,  without  a clear  delineation  of their  pperty
rights  their  competitiveness  may  quickly  evaporae. The  ambiguidts  in the  dsao  of many  SOEs  do not provide
appropri  incentive  for the shift of resources  to the export  sector. And  without  investmet there  can be no
modernizaion  of goods  for export  markets. In addition,  the SOEs'  organizational  structures  were ill-adapted  to
market  conditions.  Privatization  of the  SOBs,  usually  preceded  by orgaizatidoa resuctuing to make  suftaowud
assets  more  attracive  to potentdal  investors,  is likely  to increase  their  intentational  compettivene. Moreover,  tho
move  from  labor-maged SOEs  to privately-owned  firms  would  assure  tat  export  proceeds  would  be invested  and
not consmed by wage  increases.
27 During  the first  six months  of 1992,  the third  year  of the  tansformation rogram,  Polish  exports  in currmt
prices  inceasod  by 12.59%  (CPO  1992:1).23
While  the  absence  of an export-promoting  infrastrucure  was  not particularly  rolovant  for the  large  SOBs
with  an earlier  presence  in Western  nmrkets,  its lack  may  hamper  exports  of newly-established  private  firms. The
problem  is that  they  are usually  small  and seldom  have  information  capabilities  for identifying  export  opporunities.
In addition,  since  they  lack  capital,  they  tend  to trade  with  geographically  close  countries,  as the  recent  expeience
of small  PoLish  finus  illustra.  Private  small  and medium-sized  firms  engaged  in exports  mainly  to goographicaly
adjacent  markets-to  Germany  and  other  EC countries.  (see  CPO-1992  and MWGZ-1992)  Their  share  in expots,
though  increasing,  remains  lower that gheir  share in aggregate  output.  In brief, therefore,  privatization  and
organizational  restrcturing  of SOEs  combined  with  the development  of infrastuctr  facilitating  access  to foreign
markets  may  provide  a strong  stimulus  to exports.
V. CONCLUSION
Poland  has  maode  sgnificant  strides  in integraing  into  the  world  economy.  A streegic  decision  of the  first
noncommunist  govemmnt to move  quicldy to an open, market  economy  had a dramatic  impact  on Poland's
external  economic  links. Theri was  a sharp  upswing  in exports  to the  West,  in particular  to the  EC (and  specificayl
to Germany),  which  was  triggered  by the domestic  w  anomic  transformation  and the collapse  of the CMEA. Th
role  of the fomer appears  to have  been  of greater  significance.  The  compression  of domestic  demand,  resulting
from  the  libalization of domestic  prices  and the  restincve fiscal  and  monetary  policies  adopted,  provided  a stron
export timulus. The  libealization  of the foreip trde regime  and the introduction  of convertibility  in domestic
currency  for current  account  transactions  enabled  private  and state-owned  firms  to become  actively  involved  in
foreign  trade. The  intmoduction  of curmrcy  convertibility  for current  account  tanctions,  combined  with  a vey
deep  devaluation  of the doty, sgnificantly  increased  the profitability  of exports,  especialy  in 1990. Hence,  the
measures  introduced  as  a part of the stabilization-cansfornation  program  created  a  stog  pro-export
nvironment.
That  the  economy,  dominated  by SOEs,  was  able  to respond  to the  new  incentives  was  the  result  of changes
in the economic  system  implemented  in the 1980s. In retrospect,  the ability  of the SOEs  to respond  to the  new
incentives  was  cleady underrated. Tho  various  reform  measures  introduced  in the 1980s  turned  out to provide24
fertile ground for a quick move from a supply-  to a demand-constrained  economy,  whereas  they had a rather limited
impact in improving  micro-economic  efficiency  under the earlier adnministrative  economic  system.  The changes
significantly  increased  the autonomy  of SOEs  in conducting  their domestic  and foreign  transactions. The extension
of licenses  to other than centralized  foreign  trade organizations-the  tuaditional  guardians  of the state monopoly  over
foreign trade-led to an increase in the number of SOEs directly responsible  for their exports.'  The foreig
currency retention schemes, allowing  exporters to retain a portion of their hard currency  earnings, contributed  to
the proliferation  of marketing  skills,  as they  could use foreign  exchange  receipts  to purchase  imports. For instance,
around  50% of all imports  were financed  from this source in 1989  (Olechowski  and Oles, 1991:157). The gradual
dismantling  of the state monopoly  over foreign trade in the 1980s  forced SOEs to develop contacts with Western
customers and gain some expertise in marketing  their products.  As a recent World Bank study shows (Mueller,
1991), the driving force behind Poland's export expansion  in the West were the SOEs with earlier expoure  to
Western clients.  In the administrative  institutional  environmt  of the 1980s, however, these measr  only
exacerbated  disequilibria  and had a limited  impact on export performance.
Another factor  which clearly facilitated  integration  into the world economy  in the 1990-91  period was the
earlier progress made in the development  of trade relations  with the West.  Despite membership  in the CMEA,
Poland has been a member of the GAT1 since 1967, and the foreign trade component  of the stabilization-cum
transformation  program has proceeded  within the GATr fraework.  Although  Poland  had been treated different!y
than market  economies  because  its foreign  trade activities  were conducted  through the plan, once foreign  trade was
liberalized, tariffs (which  had already been in place) became  the effective  tool of commercial  policy, like in other
market economies. In the second  half of the 1980s,  the Polish  communist  government  actively  sought to establish
closer relations  with the EC.  Following  a series of negotiations  accelerated  by Solidarity's  victory in the limitedly-
free elections in June 1989, a co-operation  agreement on commercial relations was signed.  Finally, Poland's
membership  in the International  Monetary  Fund and in the World Bank since 1986 tumed out to be of significant
importance  in the quick development  of the stabilization  program and obtaining  external technical  and financial
28 Between  1982  and 1985,  the number  of SOEs  empowered  to conduct  their foreign  trade operations  increased
from 109 to 361.  By the end of the 1980s, the state monopoly  was terminated  (Olechowski  and Oles, 1991:156
and 158).2S
support  for its implementation.
Contra  to expectations,  the severnce  of links  that  used  to bind  the  Polish  economy  with  the CMEA  and
the  FSU  did  not produce  a catastophic  contraction  in economic  activity.  Although  the  shift  to wodd  prices  inflicted
large  ter-of-trade  losses  on the  Polish  economy,  the  contraction  and  change  in the  composition  of CMEA  import
demand  contributed  in some  degree  to the export  expansion  in the West.
Ihe existing  dissonance  between  the  factor  content  of Polish  exports,  increasingly  skewed  towards  unsklled
labor-intensive  products,  and the  general  level  of skils and education  should  be a temporny  phenomenon.  Poland
seems  to have  a potential  compuativo  advantage  in products  requiring  iputs  of skilled  labor. However,  any
temptation  to provide  duect incentives  through  tax  concessions  or other  intments  distortig competitive  markets
should  be disregarded  at least  for now,  as scarce  resources  should  be usd to develop  a fimancial  sector  supporive
o  markets  and export-oriented  activities  as wel as to remove  ambiguities  in the property rights  status  of SOEs.26
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